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    Non-fundamental entities can exist without being truthmak... — Carmelics
    Home/Modality & Possibility
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    Supports→A theory that entails that Ks exist does not thereby incur ontological commitment to Ks if Ks are not fundamental entities.

    Non-fundamental entities can exist without being truthmakers.

    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge
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    A theory that entails that Ks exist does not thereby incur ontological commitmen...Only fundamental entities — those with real existence — can play the truthmaking...Ontological commitment on the truthmaker account requires that Ks be truthmakers...

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    Only fundamental entities — those with real existence — can play the t...88%Only entities with real existence can be truthmakers.86%A theory that entails that Ks exist does not thereby incur ontological...82%The truthmakers for a theory are entities whose existence is sufficien...82%

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    The truthmaker criterion for ontological commitment to kinds, as formulated above, strengthens the modal entailment criterion (§2.2) since, necessarily, if Ks are among the truthmakers for T, then Ks exist. Thus, on a truthmaker account, for a theory to be ontologically committed to Ks, it is required not only that there exist Ks if the theory is true, but that there exist Ks that are truthmakers for the theory, if the theory is true. The chief reason given for the strengthening (Cameron 2008, 2

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