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    A theory that entails that Ks exist does not thereby incu... — Carmelics
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    Home/Modality & Possibility
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    A theory that entails that Ks exist does not thereby incur ontological commitment to Ks if Ks are not fundamental entities.

    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Ontological commitment on the truthmaker account requires that Ks be truthmakers for the theory, not merely that Ks exist if the theory is true.
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    • 2.Only fundamental entities — those with real existence — can play the truthmaking role, per the grounding account of truthmaking.
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    • 3.Non-fundamental entities can exist without being truthmakers.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Quine's criterion ties ontological commitment to existential quantification in true theories, not to metaphysical fundamentality.
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    • 2.Distinguishing fundamental from non-fundamental existence reintroduces a two-tier ontology Quine's framework was designed to eliminate.
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    • 3.If a theory's quantifiers range over Ks and the theory is true, Ks are in the domain of quantification regardless of their derivative status.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.On Fine's metaontological view, real existence is a substantive notion, but derivative entities like sets and composites still genuinely exist.
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    • 2.A theory that entails the existence of derivative entities—like mereological sums in Lewis's plural quantification—commits us to those entities as part of ontology's subject matter.
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    Related

    A theory that entails the existence of derivative entities—like mereological sum...Distinguishing fundamental from non-fundamental existence reintroduces a two-tie...If a theory's quantifiers range over Ks and the theory is true, Ks are in the do...Non-fundamental entities can exist without being truthmakers.
    +4 moreShow less
    On Fine's metaontological view, real existence is a substantive notion, but deri...Only fundamental entities — those with real existence — can play the truthmaking...Ontological commitment on the truthmaker account requires that Ks be truthmakers...Quine's criterion ties ontological commitment to existential quantification in t...

    Similar

    If entity X cannot exist without entity Y existing, then a theory asse...89%The ontological commitments of a theory are not necessarily entities w...85%A theory containing '∃x x = {a, b}' is ontologically committed to the ...83%Non-fundamental entities can exist without being truthmakers.82%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: ontological-commitment
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    The truthmaker criterion for ontological commitment to kinds, as formulated above, strengthens the modal entailment criterion (§2.2) since, necessarily, if Ks are among the truthmakers for T, then Ks exist. Thus, on a truthmaker account, for a theory to be ontologically committed to Ks, it is required not only that there exist Ks if the theory is true, but that there exist Ks that are truthmakers for the theory, if the theory is true. The chief reason given for the strengthening (Cameron 2008, 2
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit