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    Objects of visual perception are intersubjectively access... — Carmelics
    Home/Perception
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Objects of visual perception are intersubjectively accessible, meaning they can in principle be perceived by multiple subjects.

    Consciousness & MindPerception
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Two subjects, A and B, can perceive a numerically identical object.
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    • 2.Intersubjective accessibility requires only that an object can in principle be the object of another's perception.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Perceptual experience is constituted by embodied, perspectival acts that are strictly first-personal and non-transferable across subjects.
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    • 2.What A perceives is always A's perspectival adumbration of the object, not the object as a neutral shared entity.
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    • 3.Therefore two subjects access numerically distinct perspectival appearances, undermining the claim that they perceive a single identical object.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Berkeley's idealism demonstrates that objects of perception are mind-dependent bundles of ideas, existing only within the perceiving mind.
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    • 2.If perceptual objects are strictly mind-dependent, then the 'same' object perceived by A and B are numerically distinct idea-collections with no mind-independent referent to share.
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    Topics

    PerceptionConsciousness & Mind

    Connections

    1 topic

    Philosophy of Language1 linked

    Related

    Berkeley's idealism demonstrates that objects of perception are mind-dependent b...If perceptual objects are strictly mind-dependent, then the 'same' object percei...Intersubjective accessibility requires only that an object can in principle be t...Perceptual experience is constituted by embodied, perspectival acts that are str...
    +3 moreShow less
    Therefore two subjects access numerically distinct perspectival appearances, und...Two subjects, A and B, can perceive a numerically identical object.What A perceives is always A's perspectival adumbration of the object, not the o...

    Similar

    Perceptual experiences are not intersubjectively accessible in the sam...85%Intersubjective accessibility requires only that an object can in prin...81%Although two subjects can perceive a numerically identical object, eac...80%Judgments of perception are valid merely for the subject making them.79%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: self-consciousness-phenomenological
    View source passageHide passage
    It seems clear that the objects of my visual perception are intersubjectively accessible in the sense that they can in principle be the objects of another’s perception. A subject’s perceptual experience itself, however, is given in a unique way to the subject herself. Although two people, A and B, can perceive a numerically identical object, they each have their own distinct perceptual experience of it; just as they cannot share each other’s pain, they cannot literally share these perceptual exp
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit