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    Perceptual experiences are not intersubjectively accessib... — Carmelics
    Home/Perception
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Perceptual experiences are not intersubjectively accessible in the same way their objects are; each subject has their own distinct perceptual experience.

    Consciousness & MindPerception
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Although two subjects can perceive a numerically identical object, each has their own distinct perceptual experience of it.
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    • 2.Just as two subjects cannot share each other's pain, they cannot literally share perceptual experiences.
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    • 3.Perceptual experiences are epistemically asymmetrical between subjects.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Husserl's account of intersubjectivity via empathy (Einfühlung) shows that perceptual experience has a constitutively shared intentional structure, not merely shared objects.
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    • 2.If the very sense of perceiving a public object requires constituting it as perceivable by others, then perceptual experience is intersubjectively structured from within.
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    • 3.The alleged privacy of experience and the intersubjective accessibility of objects cannot be cleanly separated at the level of intentional constitution.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Wittgenstein's private language argument establishes that the very conceptual content of perceptual reports presupposes shared public criteria, undermining strong experiential privacy.
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    • 2.If perceptual experiences are individuated by their conceptual content, and that content is irreducibly public, then experiences are not as epistemically asymmetrical as the claim asserts.
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    Topics

    PerceptionConsciousness & Mind

    Related

    Although two subjects can perceive a numerically identical object, each has thei...Husserl's account of intersubjectivity via empathy (Einfühlung) shows that perce...If perceptual experiences are individuated by their conceptual content, and that...If the very sense of perceiving a public object requires constituting it as perc...
    +4 moreShow less
    Just as two subjects cannot share each other's pain, they cannot literally share...Perceptual experiences are epistemically asymmetrical between subjects.The alleged privacy of experience and the intersubjective accessibility of objec...Wittgenstein's private language argument establishes that the very conceptual co...

    Similar

    If two experiences cannot be discriminated on the basis of introspecti...86%Objects of visual perception are intersubjectively accessible, meaning...85%If an experience is introspectively indiscriminable from an experience...85%If one experience has only sense-data as its objects and a second expe...84%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: self-consciousness-phenomenological
    View source passageHide passage
    It seems clear that the objects of my visual perception are intersubjectively accessible in the sense that they can in principle be the objects of another’s perception. A subject’s perceptual experience itself, however, is given in a unique way to the subject herself. Although two people, A and B, can perceive a numerically identical object, they each have their own distinct perceptual experience of it; just as they cannot share each other’s pain, they cannot literally share these perceptual exp
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit