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    On the fictionalist view, (P) is strictly speaking untrue. — Carmelics
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    On the fictionalist view, (P) is strictly speaking untrue.

    Philosophy of Language
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.(P) talks about the property of Gness.
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    • 2.According to nominalism, there is no such thing as Gness.
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    • 3.A sentence that refers to a non-existent entity is strictly speaking untrue.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.A sentence can be 'strictly speaking untrue' as a literal assertion yet still express a true proposition under a paraphrase that eliminates abstract reference.
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    • 2.Hartry Field's fictionalism preserves the nominalistically acceptable content of mathematical claims without requiring those claims to be literally true.
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    • 3.Therefore, the fictionalist need not hold that (P) fails to convey accurate information—only that its surface form misleads about ontological commitment.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Jody Azzouni argues that singular terms can be 'ontologically non-committing' even when they successfully refer, undermining the inference from reference to existence.
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    • 2.If reference does not entail existence, then a sentence referring to Gness is not automatically untrue merely because Gness lacks being in the nominalist's inventory.
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    Philosophy of Language

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    Related

    (P) talks about the property of Gness.A sentence can be 'strictly speaking untrue' as a literal assertion yet still ex...A sentence that refers to a non-existent entity is strictly speaking untrue.According to nominalism, there is no such thing as Gness.
    +4 moreShow less
    Hartry Field's fictionalism preserves the nominalistically acceptable content of...If reference does not entail existence, then a sentence referring to Gness is no...Jody Azzouni argues that singular terms can be 'ontologically non-committing' ev...Therefore, the fictionalist need not hold that (P) fails to convey accurate info...

    Similar

    Calling something a fiction is tantamount to saying it is false79%Not everything said in a novel is untrue (e.g., Tolstoy's War and Peac...78%Models should not be regarded as fictions77%The notion of fiction should not be analyzed in terms of falsity77%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: platonism
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    On this view, (P) is equivalent to (N). That is, it says the very same thing. And neither sentence, according to this view, entails the existence of Gness. We can call this a paraphrase-nominalist view of sentences like (P). But nominalists needn't endorse this view. They can also endorse a fictionalist view of sentences like (P). On this view, (P) and (N) do not, strictly speaking, say the same thing, because (P) talks about the property of Gness and (N) does not. According to this fictionalist
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit