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    According to nominalism, there is no such thing as Gness. — Carmelics
    Home/Philosophy of Language
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    Supports→On the fictionalist view, (P) is strictly speaking untrue.

    According to nominalism, there is no such thing as Gness.

    Modality & PossibilityPhilosophy of Language
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    (P) talks about the property of Gness.A sentence that refers to a non-existent entity is strictly speaking untrue.On the fictionalist view, (P) is strictly speaking untrue.

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    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    Resemblance nominalism is false.88%On the paraphrase-nominalist view, (P) says the very same thing as (N)...84%Paraphrase nominalism holds that a property-predication sentence (P) i...81%Paraphrase nominalism fails in the case of propositions80%

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    On this view, (P) is equivalent to (N). That is, it says the very same thing. And neither sentence, according to this view, entails the existence of Gness. We can call this a paraphrase-nominalist view of sentences like (P). But nominalists needn't endorse this view. They can also endorse a fictionalist view of sentences like (P). On this view, (P) and (N) do not, strictly speaking, say the same thing, because (P) talks about the property of Gness and (N) does not. According to this fictionalist

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