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    On the Geachian view, God's beliefs about the contingent ... — Carmelics
    Home/Free Will & Foreknowledge
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    On the Geachian view, God's beliefs about the contingent future constitute genuine knowledge.

    Free Will & Foreknowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • God's beliefs about the contingent future track the changing truth about where the future is headed.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Knowledge requires a truth-maker that is settled and determinate at the time of belief formation.
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    • 2.On the Geachian view, contingent future propositions lack a determinate truth value prior to the relevant events.
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    • 3.A belief formed about an indeterminate proposition cannot constitute genuine knowledge, regardless of divine reliability.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Tracking a 'direction' of the future presupposes a causal or modal connection between the belief and its object.
      ?

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    • 2.If future contingents are genuinely open, no such connection can ground the belief's content without collapsing the contingency.
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    • 3.Geachian soft facts about God's beliefs therefore either undermine genuine openness or fail the tracking condition for knowledge.
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    Topics

    Free Will & Foreknowledge

    Key Terms

    knowledge(Distinguished from mere true belief, which may be the product of indoctrination and need not exercise deliberative capacities.)
    Justified true belief — true belief that has been arrived at through the exercise of deliberative capacities, including comparison of and deliberation among alternatives.

    Related

    A belief formed about an indeterminate proposition cannot constitute genuine kno...Geachian soft facts about God's beliefs therefore either undermine genuine openn...God's beliefs about the contingent future track the changing truth about where t...If future contingents are genuinely open, no such connection can ground the beli...
    +3 moreShow less
    Knowledge requires a truth-maker that is settled and determinate at the time of ...On the Geachian view, contingent future propositions lack a determinate truth va...Tracking a 'direction' of the future presupposes a causal or modal connection be...

    Similar

    God's beliefs about the contingent future track the changing truth abo...88%Molinism provides an account of how God knows the contingent future, a...83%Human beings are sometimes in a knowledge-conferring situation (KCS) w...83%Impossibility of knowing future contingent propositions applies univer...81%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: free-will-foreknowledge
    View source passageHide passage
    This argument is formulated in a way that makes its logical form as perspicuous as possible, and there is a consensus that this argument or something close to it is valid. That is, if the premises are all true, the conclusion follows. The compatibilist about infallible foreknowledge and free will must therefore find a false premise. There are four premises that are not straightforward substitutions in definitions: (1), (2), (5), and (9). All four of these premises have come under attack in the history of discussion of theological fatalism. Aristotle’s concern about future contingent truth has ...

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit