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    Once iterated AGM revision is formalized, the principle B... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Epistemic logic can express principles that AGM belief revision and non-monotonic logic cannot straightforwardly express

    Once iterated AGM revision is formalized, the principle Bp → BBp can be captured by constraints on the agent's conditional belief structure without modal operators.

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    1 reason for
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    Reasons For

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    Reason for
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    • 1.AGM revision naturally encodes introspective closure: if an agent revises by p, conditional belief structures track what they'd believe given p.
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    • 2.Modal operator Bp→BBp requires semantic access to belief operators themselves; conditional structures avoid this by using object-level constraints.
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    • 3.Iterated revision sequences create nested conditionals (believe q given p, given r) that formally mirror the nested belief depth of Bp→BBp.
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    Reasons Against

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    • 1.Conditional beliefs about p given p are not equivalent to believing that one believes p—they conflate epistemic levels in distinct ways.
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    • 2.AGM revision constrains how beliefs change, not the truth conditions of introspective claims; these solve different formal problems.
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    • 3.Capturing Bp→BBp requires encoding *which facts make introspection true*, not merely the structure of belief updates across scenarios.
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    Connections

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    Truth & Knowledge1 linkedConsciousness & Mind1 linked

    Related

    AGM revision constrains how beliefs change, not the truth conditions of introspe...AGM revision naturally encodes introspective closure: if an agent revises by p, ...Capturing Bp→BBp requires encoding *which facts make introspection true*, not me...Conditional beliefs about p given p are not equivalent to believing that one bel...
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    Epistemic logic can express principles that AGM belief revision and non-monotoni...Iterated revision sequences create nested conditionals (believe q given p, given...Modal operator Bp→BBp requires semantic access to belief operators themselves; c...

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    Perspectives
    2 (1 for, 1 against)
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