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    Epistemic logic can express principles that AGM belief re... — Carmelics
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    Home/Consciousness & Mind
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    Epistemic logic can express principles that AGM belief revision and non-monotonic logic cannot straightforwardly express

    Consciousness & MindTruth & Knowledge
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Epistemic logic can express the principle that if an agent believes p, then the agent also believes that the agent believes p (Bp → BBp)
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    • 2.AGM belief revision cannot clearly express iterated belief (BBp) because membership in a belief set does not straightforwardly encode higher-order belief
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    • 3.Non-monotonic logic cannot straightforwardly express the principle Bp → BBp either
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.AGM belief revision can be extended to iterated revision via Darwiche and Pearl's (1997) postulates, which encode higher-order doxastic states in epistemic entrenchment orderings.
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    • 2.Once iterated AGM revision is formalized, the principle Bp → BBp can be captured by constraints on the agent's conditional belief structure without modal operators.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.The principle Bp → BBp is rejected by most epistemologists as psychologically unrealistic and is explicitly denied in weak S4-alternatives like the logic KD45 without positive introspection.
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    • 2.If Bp → BBp is not a universally valid epistemic principle, then AGM's silence on it reflects a theoretical virtue rather than an expressive limitation.
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    Consciousness & MindTruth & Knowledge

    Related

    AGM belief revision can be extended to iterated revision via Darwiche and Pearl'...AGM belief revision cannot clearly express iterated belief (BBp) because members...Epistemic logic can express the principle that if an agent believes p, then the ...If Bp → BBp is not a universally valid epistemic principle, then AGM's silence o...
    +3 moreShow less
    Non-monotonic logic cannot straightforwardly express the principle Bp → BBp eith...Once iterated AGM revision is formalized, the principle Bp → BBp can be captured...The principle Bp → BBp is rejected by most epistemologists as psychologically un...

    Similar

    AGM belief revision and non-monotonic logic do not have separate opera...90%Epistemic logic can express the interaction between knowledge and beli...87%Non-monotonic logic cannot straightforwardly express the principle Bp ...86%Epistemic logic can express the principle that everything known is als...82%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: formal-belief
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    Epistemic logic, which in its modern formulation is typically traced to von Wright (1951) and Hintikka (1962), is a formal framework designed to foreground these matters. For an influential introductory text, see Fagin et al. (1995). The formal language of epistemic logic extends that of propositional logic with epistemic operators \({\bf B}_a \phi\) and \({\bf K}_a \phi\), pronounced respectively as ‘agent \(a\) believes that \(\phi\),’ and ‘agent \(a\) knows that \(\phi.\)’ When only one agent
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit