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    One argument for dualism is based on the conceivability o... — Carmelics
    Home/Afterlife & Death
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    One argument for dualism is based on the conceivability of our existing without our bodies.

    Afterlife & Death
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • It is conceivable that we could exist without our bodies.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Conceivability does not entail metaphysical possibility, as Kripke demonstrated with necessary a posteriori truths like 'water is H2O'.
      ?

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    • 2.We can conceive of water without H2O, yet this conceivability fails to establish their separability as a real metaphysical possibility.
      ?

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    • 3.Therefore, conceiving of ourselves without bodies provides no reliable evidence that such separation is genuinely possible.
      ?

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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.What we conceive when imagining 'ourselves without bodies' may merely reflect our incomplete knowledge of mind-brain identity, not a genuine gap in nature.
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    • 2.Levine's 'explanatory gap' shows that phenomenal concepts feel separable from physical ones due to cognitive architecture, not actual ontological distinctness.
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    Afterlife & Death

    Related

    Conceivability does not entail metaphysical possibility, as Kripke demonstrated ...It is conceivable that we could exist without our bodies.Levine's 'explanatory gap' shows that phenomenal concepts feel separable from ph...Therefore, conceiving of ourselves without bodies provides no reliable evidence ...
    +2 moreShow less
    We can conceive of water without H2O, yet this conceivability fails to establish...What we conceive when imagining 'ourselves without bodies' may merely reflect ou...

    Similar

    There is reason to think that mind-body dualism is true.82%It is conceivable that we could exist without our bodies.81%If there is reason to think that mind-body dualism is true, then there...79%Mind-body dualism does not guarantee survival after death.78%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: afterlife
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    At first, it seems obvious that dualism is a “survival-friendly” perspective. If we are nothing more than our bodies, it seems that if death destroys our bodies, we are destroyed and there is nothing left of us as persons—though parts of our bodies and the particles that make it up will be scattered and perhaps (temporarily) come to be part of the bodies of other living organisms. If, however, we are nonphysical (or immaterial) minds or souls or persons who are embodied, then even the complete annihilation of our physical bodies does not entail our annihilation as persons. In fact, one of seve...

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit