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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Perspectives
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    42
    One can support premises (2) and (3) by appealing to the ... — Carmelics
    Home/Problem of Evil
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    One can support premises (2) and (3) by appealing to the principle that the probability of r given q is equal to one if and only if q entails r.

    Problem of Evil
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.The existence of God is neither a logically necessary truth nor entailed by our background knowledge.
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    • 2.The existence of God together with our background knowledge does not logically entail that no good that we know of justifies an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being in permitting E1 and E2.
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    • 3.The probability of r given q is equal to one if and only if q entails r.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Probabilistic entailment admits of degrees: Carnap's inductive logic shows P(r|q)=1 can hold without strict deductive entailment via confirmation theory.
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    • 2.If analytic probabilistic relationships suffice for P(r|q)=1, the biconditional conflates logical and epistemic probability, undermining Rowe's inference.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Plantinga's free will defense shows God-plus-background-knowledge may analytically exclude certain evils, making P(no-justifying-good|God)=1 without strict entailment.
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    • 2.If modal or analytic truths about omnipotence generate probability-1 claims non-deductively, the biconditional 'iff q entails r' is too restrictive a criterion.
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    Problem of Evil

    Related

    If analytic probabilistic relationships suffice for P(r|q)=1, the biconditional ...If modal or analytic truths about omnipotence generate probability-1 claims non-...Plantinga's free will defense shows God-plus-background-knowledge may analytical...Probabilistic entailment admits of degrees: Carnap's inductive logic shows P(r|q...
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    The existence of God is neither a logically necessary truth nor entailed by our ...The existence of God together with our background knowledge does not logically e...The probability of r given q is equal to one if and only if q entails r.

    Similar

    The probability of r given q is equal to one if and only if q entails ...92%For any two propositions q and r, if q entails r then Pr(r | q) = 1.81%The fundamental equiprobability assumption in logical probability need...74%It follows deductively from those probabilistic premises, via axioms o...73%

    Source

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    SEP: evil
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    Secondly, if the existence of God is neither a logically necessary truth nor entailed by our background knowledge, and if the existence of God together with our background knowledge does not logically entail that no good that we know of justifies an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being in permitting \(E_1\) and \(E_2\), then one can support (2) and (3) by appealing to the very plausible principle that the probability of \(r\) given \(q\) is equal to one if and only if \(q\) entails \(r\).

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit