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    The fundamental equiprobability assumption in logical pro... — Carmelics
    Home/Problem of Evil
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    The fundamental equiprobability assumption in logical probability needs to be formulated in terms of governing laws of nature rather than structure descriptions.

    Problem of Evil
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Tooley employs a Carnapian theory in which the basic equiprobability assumption is formulated in terms of structure descriptions.
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    • 2.If governing laws are logically possible, then the fundamental equiprobability assumption needs to be formulated in terms of governing laws of nature.
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    • 3.Tooley holds that governing laws are logically possible.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Humean regularity theories of laws deny that governing laws are metaphysically distinct from observed regularities, undermining the premise that they require separate probabilistic treatment.
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    • 2.If laws just are regularities (Lewis, Earman), reformulating equiprobability in terms of governing laws collapses back into structure-description approaches, making the proposed revision circular.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Carnap's inductive logic was explicitly designed to remain neutral on metaphysical disputes about the nature of laws, so invoking governing laws imports unargued metaphysical commitments into a formal probabilistic framework.
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    • 2.A probability calculus that presupposes contested Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley necessitation relations inherits their disputed ontology, reducing the epistemic force of any probabilistic argument that relies on it.
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    Problem of Evil

    Related

    A probability calculus that presupposes contested Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley neces...Carnap's inductive logic was explicitly designed to remain neutral on metaphysic...Humean regularity theories of laws deny that governing laws are metaphysically d...If governing laws are logically possible, then the fundamental equiprobability a...
    +3 moreShow less
    If laws just are regularities (Lewis, Earman), reformulating equiprobability in ...Tooley employs a Carnapian theory in which the basic equiprobability assumption ...Tooley holds that governing laws are logically possible.

    Similar

    If governing laws are logically possible, then the fundamental equipro...91%Tooley employs a Carnapian theory in which the basic equiprobability a...82%By bringing in an equiprobability principle, one approaches the issue ...81%The equiprobability-principle approach to the inductive step in the ar...75%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: evil
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    As regards (2), it certainly seems plausible, assuming that the existence of God is not logically necessary, that there is at least some non-zero probability that God does not exist, given our background knowledge. But one can derive (2), provided that one is willing to accept the (not uncontroversial) principle that only necessarily false propositions have a probability equal to zero. (This principle is very plausible if one accepts the idea of infinitesimals. If one does not, one may hold that some contingent propositions have a probability equal to zero.) Given this assumption, the reasonin...

    Details

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    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit