One gets a first-person belief by believing a proposition including one's own haecceity, and a present-time belief by believing a proposition involving the haecceity of a moment of time at the time in question.
proposition(Used in the context of a semantic theory sensitive to differences in subject matter.)
The content expressed by a sentence, individuated at least in part by the subject matter of the sentence and the contents of its subsentential expressions.
Given the structural similarity between the objection from present-time knowledge and the objection from first-person knowledge it is not surprising that philosophers have given parallel replies. (See Sosa 1983a,b on the analogy between first-person and present-time knowledge.) What is perhaps more surprising is that it has, for the most part, been opponents of the argument who have attempted to supply the details of exactly what the objects of knowledge and belief are in the case of knowledge of the present and of oneself. On the one hand, perhaps the propositions we know when we know what da...