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    God can believe the same propositions we do without getti... — Carmelics
    Home/Divine Attributes
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    God can believe the same propositions we do without getting first-person belief about someone else, and whether he gets present-time belief depends on whether he believes in time or out of time.

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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Present-time and first-person beliefs involve propositions that include haecceities (individual essences) of persons and times.
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    • 2.One gets a first-person belief by believing a proposition including one's own haecceity, and a present-time belief by believing a proposition involving the haecceity of a moment of time at the time in question.
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    • 3.The relevant propositions do not include God's own haecceity, so he does not get a first-person belief about someone else.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Haecceities of times are only epistemically accessible to a subject located at that time, not merely believing a proposition containing them.
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    • 2.A being outside time cannot satisfy the indexical acquaintance condition required to tokenize 'now', rendering present-time belief structurally unavailable to it.
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    • 3.Therefore, divine atemporality does not merely affect *when* God believes but eliminates the cognitive relation necessary for genuinely present-tense belief.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Castañeda's work on quasi-indicators shows that first-person and present-time beliefs are irreducibly perspectival and cannot be fully captured by any third-personal propositional content.
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    • 2.If no propositional haecceity-content can exhaustively represent the de se and de nunc content of indexical belief, then God's believing those propositions leaves the essential perspectival residue ungrasped.
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    • 3.An omniscient being who fails to grasp any cognitively accessible content thereby falls short of omniscience, regardless of whether that content is labeled 'propositional'.
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    Topics

    Divine Attributes

    Key Terms

    First-person belief(as the type of belief Perry focuses on)
    A thought you have about yourself using 'I'—like 'I am hungry'—rather than a description of yourself from the outside.
    Present-time belief (or tensed knowledge)(as used in philosophy of time and religion)
    Believing something as happening right now, rather than just knowing it happened in the past or will happen in the future. The question here is whether God experiences time like we do or sees all moments equally.
    Timeless (or atemporality)(as used in metaphysics and philosophy of religion)
    Existing outside of time, not moving from past to future. Some philosophers argue God exists this way, experiencing all moments simultaneously rather than one after another.
    epistemology(Contrasted with purely descriptive scientific inquiry)
    A normative enterprise that tells us how we ought to reason from evidence and how we ought to justify our beliefs, as distinct from merely describing how we do reason or justify beliefs
    omniscience(The passage tests omniscience against mathematical undecidability)
    The property of knowing everything; used here to probe whether divine knowledge extends to undecided mathematical propositions.
    proposition(Used in the context of a semantic theory sensitive to differences in subject matter.)
    The content expressed by a sentence, individuated at least in part by the subject matter of the sentence and the contents of its subsentential expressions.

    Related

    A being outside time cannot satisfy the indexical acquaintance condition require...An omniscient being who fails to grasp any cognitively accessible content thereb...Castañeda's work on quasi-indicators shows that first-person and present-time be...Haecceities of times are only epistemically accessible to a subject located at t...
    +6 moreShow less
    If no propositional haecceity-content can exhaustively represent the de se and d...It is not knowing the propositions that makes God temporal; it is whether he bel...

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: omniscience
    View source passageHide passage
    Omniscience is supposed to be knowledge that is maximal or complete. Perhaps knowledge of all truths, as (D1) puts it, captures that idea. But there are other features that might be included in such maximal knowledge when it is had by a perfect being. For example, perhaps a perfect being does not merely believe all true propositions but, in addition, could not possibly be mistaken. Perhaps, in other words, such a being is infallible, that is, necessarily such that any proposition it believes is true. Van Inwagen (2006: 26) adds to his variant of (D1) that it is impossible that there is a propo...

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit
    One gets a first-person belief by believing a proposition including one's own ha...
    Present-time and first-person beliefs involve propositions that include haecceit...
    The relevant propositions do not include God's own haecceity, so he does not get...
    Therefore, divine atemporality does not merely affect *when* God believes but el...

    Similar

    One gets a first-person belief by believing a proposition including on...86%God can believe the same propositions we do without thereby acquiring ...86%It is not knowing the propositions that makes God temporal; it is whet...83%Present-time and first-person beliefs involve propositions that includ...81%