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Inverse View
It is not the case that Ontological modalities ground the differences between the real, ideal, knowledge, and logical spheres of being.
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Reasons For
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Reason for 1 of 2
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1.
Modal distinctions (possibility, necessity, actuality) are logical or epistemic categories, not ontological ones, as Kant demonstrated in the Critique of Pure Reason.
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2.
If modalities are forms of cognition rather than features of being, they cannot ground distinctions between ontological spheres without circularity.
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Reason for 2 of 2
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1.
Quine argued in 'On What There Is' that positing irreducibly distinct ontological spheres multiplies entities beyond necessity and violates parsimony.
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2.
The distinction between 'real' and 'ideal' spheres collapses if, as nominalists contend, ideal objects like mathematical entities have no mode of being independent of real instantiation or mental representation.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
The modalities of possibility, necessity, and actuality distinguish principal and secondary spheres of being.
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2.
The real and ideal spheres are principal spheres, while knowledge and logic are secondary spheres.
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