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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Orthodox phenomenism is inferior to representationalism and sense-datum theory with respect to explaining entailment relations between qualia-statements.

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Representationalism and the sense-datum theory each have simple accounts of entailment relations between qualia-statements grounded in the structure of the objects of experience.
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    • 2.The orthodox phenomenist cannot give a similar structural explanation of these entailment relations.
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    • 3.It is not clear whether the orthodox phenomenist is even entitled to assert these entailment relations at all.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Representationalism grounds qualia-entailments in intentional content structure: if red entails colored, this follows from representational content relations (Tye 1995).
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    • 2.Sense-datum theory grounds qualia-entailments in mind-independent properties of sense-data objects, giving a realist basis for necessary connections (Jackson 1977).
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    • 3.Orthodox phenomenism, identifying qualia with bare experiential character without objects or content, lacks any structural substrate from which entailment relations could be derived.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Chisholm's adverbial phenomenism collapses entailments like 'sensing redly entails sensing coloredly' into primitive brute facts with no explanatory grounding.
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    • 2.Explanatory adequacy requires that necessary connections between phenomenal properties be derivable from some account of those properties' natures, not merely stipulated.
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    • 3.A theory that can only assert but never explain why qualia-entailments hold is explanatorily inferior to theories that derive them from representational or object-based structure.
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