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    Outcomes in expected-utility calculations must include ev... — Carmelics
    Home/Consequentialism
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Outcomes in expected-utility calculations must include every relevant consideration, not merely causal consequences

    Consequentialism
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Richard Jeffrey's evidential decision theory explicitly incorporates non-causal factors like news value and symbolic meaning into utility calculations.
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    • 2.Restricting outcomes to causal consequences arbitrarily privileges one metaphysical category over others that agents rationally care about.
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    • 3.Savage's framework grounds expected utility in preference axioms that are silent on whether relevant considerations must be causal in nature.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Risk aversion, as Buchak argues in 'Risk and Rationality', reflects rational attitudes toward gambles that pure causal-consequence accounting systematically misrepresents.
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    • 2.An expected-utility framework that excludes non-causal considerations like procedural fairness violates the completeness requirement of rational preference orderings.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.The expected-utility principle requires that outcomes include every relevant consideration
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    • 2.Narrowing outcomes only to causal consequences may omit relevant factors such as risk aversion
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    Topics

    Consequentialism

    Related

    An expected-utility framework that excludes non-causal considerations like proce...Narrowing outcomes only to causal consequences may omit relevant factors such as...Restricting outcomes to causal consequences arbitrarily privileges one metaphysi...Richard Jeffrey's evidential decision theory explicitly incorporates non-causal ...
    +3 moreShow less
    Risk aversion, as Buchak argues in 'Risk and Rationality', reflects rational att...Savage's framework grounds expected utility in preference axioms that are silent...The expected-utility principle requires that outcomes include every relevant con...

    Similar

    The expected-utility principle requires that outcomes include every re...86%The expected-utility principle requires all relevant considerations to...86%Aggregated probabilities play a key role in calculations of expected u...80%The expected utility criterion does not necessarily follow from utilit...79%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: decision-causal
    View source passageHide passage
    One issue concerning outcomes is their comprehensiveness. Are an act’s outcomes possible worlds, temporal aftermaths, or causal consequences? Gibbard and Harper ([1978] 1981: 166–168) mention the possibility of narrowing outcomes to causal consequences, as practical applicability advocates. The narrowing must be judicious, however, because the expected-utility principle requires that outcomes include every relevant consideration. For example, if an agent is averse to risk, then each of a risky a
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit