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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Outcomes in expected-utility calculations must include every relevant consideration, not merely causal consequences

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.The expected-utility principle requires that outcomes include every relevant consideration
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    • 2.Narrowing outcomes only to causal consequences may omit relevant factors such as risk aversion
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Richard Jeffrey's evidential decision theory explicitly incorporates non-causal factors like news value and symbolic meaning into utility calculations.
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    • 2.Restricting outcomes to causal consequences arbitrarily privileges one metaphysical category over others that agents rationally care about.
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    • 3.Savage's framework grounds expected utility in preference axioms that are silent on whether relevant considerations must be causal in nature.
      ?

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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Risk aversion, as Buchak argues in 'Risk and Rationality', reflects rational attitudes toward gambles that pure causal-consequence accounting systematically misrepresents.
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    • 2.An expected-utility framework that excludes non-causal considerations like procedural fairness violates the completeness requirement of rational preference orderings.
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