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    P disconfirms G in the sense of lowering the probability ... — Carmelics
    Home/Problem of Evil
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    P disconfirms G in the sense of lowering the probability of G.

    Problem of Evil
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • The probability that God exists is lower given the combination of P together with our background knowledge than it is given our background knowledge alone.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.On skeptical theism (Wykstra, Bergmann), human cognitive limitations make it epistemically inaccessible whether P is the kind of evidence that lowers G's probability.
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    • 2.If we cannot reliably assess the probability of gratuitous evil given theism, we lack the probabilistic baseline needed to confirm that P disconfirms G.
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    • 3.Alston's argument that we have no well-grounded probability distribution over divine reasons entails that Bayesian disconfirmation claims here are formally ungrounded.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Background knowledge K already includes the full history of suffering, so P adds no independent probabilistic weight beyond what K already encodes.
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    • 2.When P is entailed by or redundant with K, the conditional probability P(G|P&K) cannot be demonstrably lower than P(G|K).
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    Problem of Evil

    Related

    Alston's argument that we have no well-grounded probability distribution over di...Background knowledge K already includes the full history of suffering, so P adds...If we cannot reliably assess the probability of gratuitous evil given theism, we...On skeptical theism (Wykstra, Bergmann), human cognitive limitations make it epi...
    +2 moreShow less
    The probability that God exists is lower given the combination of P together wit...When P is entailed by or redundant with K, the conditional probability P(G|P&K) ...

    Similar

    A probabilistic conclusion can potentially be offset by positive evide...71%Theism is more likely to be false than to be true.70%Theism is very probably false, even when the evidence for God's existe...69%The probability that God exists is lower given the combination of P to...69%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: evil
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    The first conclusion, then, is that the probability that God exists is lower given the combination of \(P\) together with our background knowledge than it is given our background knowledge alone. Thus \(P\) disconfirms \(G\) in the sense of lowering the probability of \(G\). The second conclusion is that \(P\) disconfirms \(G\) in a different sense—namely, it, together with our background knowledge, makes it more likely than not that \(G\) is false.

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit