P4's claim that nothing resembling pain or color exists in bodies does not entail innateness, since the mind could still construct qualitative content through reliable causal co-variation with physical states, as reliabilist accounts of perception maintain.
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The actual conditions or configurations of matter and the brain, as opposed to mental experiences or thoughts.
Qualitative content(as used in philosophy of mind)
The subjective, felt experience of something—like what redness looks like or what pain feels like from the inside—rather than just the physical facts about it.
Reliabilist accounts of perception(as used in epistemology)
A theory of knowledge that says you can trust what your senses tell you if they're reliable—meaning they consistently give you accurate information about the world.