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    Pakṣaṭā is a necessary auxiliary causal condition for inf... — Carmelics
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    Home/Causation
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    Pakṣaṭā is a necessary auxiliary causal condition for inference to occur

    CausationTruth & Knowledge
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Given knowledge of the premises, inference normally occurs mechanically
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    • 2.If the conclusion is already known (e.g. perceptually), inference does not occur mechanically
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    • 3.When the conclusion is already known, the inferrer must have a special desire to re-establish it inferentially in order for inference to proceed
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Inference is fully constituted by the logical relation between vyāpti (pervasion) and pakṣadharmatā (property residing in subject), without requiring any additional motivational state.
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    • 2.Introducing pakṣaṭā as a causal condition conflates the epistemic conditions for inference with the psychological conditions for a cognizer's attention, which are categorically distinct in Nyāya metaphysics.
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    • 3.Gaṅgeśa's own Tattvacintāmaṇi grounds inferential validity in the invariable concomitance relation alone, making motivational states like desire to re-establish conclusions causally redundant.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.If pakṣaṭā were a necessary causal condition, then unconscious or automatic inferences—acknowledged in Mīmāṃsā accounts of Vedic cognition—would be impossible, which is an unacceptable consequence.
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    • 2.The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas held that inferential knowledge arises from structural relations between cognitions, not from the agent's motivational orientation toward the conclusion.
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    Moral Responsibility1 linked

    Related

    Gaṅgeśa's own Tattvacintāmaṇi grounds inferential validity in the invariable con...Given knowledge of the premises, inference normally occurs mechanicallyIf pakṣaṭā were a necessary causal condition, then unconscious or automatic infe...If the conclusion is already known (e.g. perceptually), inference does not occur...
    +4 moreShow less
    Inference is fully constituted by the logical relation between vyāpti (pervasion...Introducing pakṣaṭā as a causal condition conflates the epistemic conditions for...The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas held that inferential knowledge arises from structural...When the conclusion is already known, the inferrer must have a special desire to...

    Similar

    Humans are determined (causally necessitated) to make causal inference...81%The inferences from step 4 to 5 and from step 6 to 7 assume that if a ...80%The inferences in Scotus's argument from step 4 to 5 and from step 6 t...80%S does not need to actually draw the inference, but the inferential su...80%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: early-modern-india
    View source passageHide passage
    I will discuss mainly the definition of the ‘pervasion’ relation. First, however, a brief note on how the causal model of knowledge is applied to inference. The ‘special’ instrumental cause (karaṇa) of an inferential cognition is said to be the inferrer’s knowledge of the relevant pervasion relation. The ‘operative condition’ (vyāpāra) is said to be an awareness that the locus of inference (p) possesses such an inferential sign (h) as is pervaded by the property inferred (s). This is, in effect,
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit