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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Parfit's argument in Reasons and Persons shows that reput... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Players in a repeated game may establish commitment by reducing the value of each round so that the temptation to defect never becomes strong enough to override concern for reputation.

    Parfit's argument in Reasons and Persons shows that reputation-based cooperation collapses under the backward induction problem in finitely repeated games.

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    Social Contract1 linkedConsequentialism1 linked

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