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    Made withinDC&Austin
    Players in a repeated game may establish commitment by re... — Carmelics
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    Home/Consequentialism
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Players in a repeated game may establish commitment by reducing the value of each round so that the temptation to defect never becomes strong enough to override concern for reputation.

    ConsequentialismSocial Contract
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Reputation can be built up only through play of a repeated game.
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    • 2.The value of reputation must be greater to its cultivator than the value of sacrificing it in any particular round.
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    • 3.Reducing the value of each round lowers the payoff from defection relative to the long-run value of reputation.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Gauthier's 'constrained maximizer' shows commitment requires dispositional transformation, not merely payoff manipulation.
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    • 2.Reducing round value leaves the underlying preference structure unchanged, so defection remains rational when detection is improbable.
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    • 3.A player who would defect absent reduced stakes is not genuinely committed but merely deterred, making the 'commitment' fragile under novel conditions.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Parfit's argument in Reasons and Persons shows that reputation-based cooperation collapses under the backward induction problem in finitely repeated games.
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    • 2.If the final round always incentivizes defection regardless of stake magnitude, reducing per-round value cannot eliminate the unraveling logic that destroys cooperation.
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    Topics

    ConsequentialismSocial Contract

    Key Terms

    Repeated game(game theory and strategy)
    A situation where the same game or interaction happens multiple times between the same players, so past actions can affect future decisions.
    Temptation to defect(incentives in strategic situations)
    The appeal or pressure you feel to break a promise or agreement because you could gain something by doing so.
    commitment(Game-theoretic bargaining strategy)
    A binding obligation, such as a contract, that removes a party's freedom to choose an alternative course of action and thereby makes their stated threat believable
    defect(Used to measure how much a triangle's angle sum falls short of the Euclidean value of two right angles.)
    The difference between two right angles and the sum of the three interior angles of a triangle in Lobachevskian geometry.
    reputation(Repeated-game and social-contract theory)
    A standing assessment of an agent's reliability across a range of games, whose value can be cultivated through repeated-game play and lost by defection.

    Related

    A player who would defect absent reduced stakes is not genuinely committed but m...Gauthier's 'constrained maximizer' shows commitment requires dispositional trans...If the final round always incentivizes defection regardless of stake magnitude, ...Parfit's argument in Reasons and Persons shows that reputation-based cooperation...
    +4 moreShow less
    Reducing round value leaves the underlying preference structure unchanged, so de...Reducing the value of each round lowers the payoff from defection relative to th...

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: game-theory
    View source passageHide passage
    Certain conditions must hold if reputation effects are to underwrite commitment. A person’s reputation can have a standing value across a range of games she plays, but in that case her concern for its value should be factored into payoffs in specifying each specific game into which she enters. Reputation can be built up through play of a game only in a case of a repeated game. Then the value of the reputation must be greater to its cultivator than the value to her of sacrificing it in any partic
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Reputation can be built up only through play of a repeated game.
    The value of reputation must be greater to its cultivator than the value of sacr...

    Similar

    Reducing the value of each round lowers the payoff from defection rela...81%In the second-to-last round of a finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma,...77%There are cases in which the payoff from defecting in a current round ...76%In the final round of a finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, rational...76%
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit