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    Made withinDC&Austin
    Participants' failure to report the gorilla may be due to... — Carmelics
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    Home/Skepticism
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Participants' failure to report the gorilla may be due to the phenomenal difference being epistemically unusable rather than absent.

    Consciousness & MindSkepticism
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.A phenomenal difference can be epistemically unusable if it is immediately forgotten.
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    • 2.A phenomenal difference can be epistemically unusable if it is too unstructured and inchoate to be epistemically mobilizable.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.If a phenomenal state leaves no memorial trace and cannot influence report or behavior, there is no empirical or theoretical ground to posit it occurred.
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    • 2.Ned Block's distinction between access and phenomenal consciousness requires independent positive evidence for P-consciousness, not merely the absence of A-consciousness.
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    • 3.Positing epistemically unusable phenomenal states is an unfalsifiable auxiliary hypothesis that violates standard parsimony constraints in philosophy of mind.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Dennett's heterophenomenological method holds that subjects' reports exhaust the legitimate data for attributing conscious experience; unreported states lack evidential standing.
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    • 2.If the inattentional blindness paradigm yields no difference in behavior, report, or downstream cognition, the 'phenomenal but unusable' hypothesis explains nothing that absence of experience does not equally explain.
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    Topics

    SkepticismConsciousness & Mind

    Related

    A phenomenal difference can be epistemically unusable if it is immediately forgo...A phenomenal difference can be epistemically unusable if it is too unstructured ...Dennett's heterophenomenological method holds that subjects' reports exhaust the...If a phenomenal state leaves no memorial trace and cannot influence report or be...
    +3 moreShow less
    If the inattentional blindness paradigm yields no difference in behavior, report...Ned Block's distinction between access and phenomenal consciousness requires ind...Positing epistemically unusable phenomenal states is an unfalsifiable auxiliary ...

    Similar

    To explain participants' ignorance, it suffices to say that any phenom...80%Participants' ignorance of the gorilla's appearance is compatible with...80%Most people fail to attend to the gorilla in the unnoticed gorilla exp...79%A phenomenal difference can be epistemically unusable if it is immedia...75%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: attention
    View source passageHide passage
    No single one of these experiments can establish the claim that attention is always necessary for consciousness. That claim is a universally quantified one, and is not entailed by any one of its instances. Nor is it clear that what we see in these experiments really are instances in which unattended objects drop out of consciousness altogether. The participants’ ignorance of the gorilla’s appearance, for example, is compatible with it being the case that the presence of the gorilla does make a p
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit