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    Peter van Inwagen's 'reassembly' model proposes God prese... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→The central logical problem for materialist versions of the resurrection is personal identity.

    Peter van Inwagen's 'reassembly' model proposes God preserves the numerically identical matter, dissolving the gap problem without abandoning materialism.

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    1 reason for
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    Reasons For

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    Reason for
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    • 1.Numerically identical matter provides a concrete continuity criterion that avoids arbitrary composition decisions required by non-materialist views.
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    • 2.God's preservation of original matter sidesteps the 'gap problem' by ensuring no temporal interruption breaks the identity chain between death and resurrection.
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    • 3.Materialism gains explanatory power by anchoring personal identity in physical continuity rather than abstract souls or immaterial essences.
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    Reasons Against

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    • 1.Numerically identical matter seems neither necessary nor sufficient for personal identity: a person could survive matter replacement, yet scattered atoms lack personhood.
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    • 2.The model faces the 'duplication objection': if God reassembles both original matter and a perfect duplicate, materialism provides no principled reason to identify one as the original person.
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    • 3.Biological continuity (metabolism, growth) naturally breaks identity ties to original matter, making the preservation claim metaphysically puzzling and empirically unfounded.
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    Afterlife & Death1 linked

    Related

    Biological continuity (metabolism, growth) naturally breaks identity ties to ori...God's preservation of original matter sidesteps the 'gap problem' by ensuring no...Materialism gains explanatory power by anchoring personal identity in physical c...Numerically identical matter provides a concrete continuity criterion that avoid...
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    Numerically identical matter seems neither necessary nor sufficient for personal...The central logical problem for materialist versions of the resurrection is pers...The model faces the 'duplication objection': if God reassembles both original ma...

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