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    The central logical problem for materialist versions of t... — Carmelics
    Home/Afterlife & Death
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    The central logical problem for materialist versions of the resurrection is personal identity.

    Afterlife & Death
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.For materialism, nothing bridges the spatio-temporal gap between the body that perishes and that body resurrected.
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    • 2.Without such a bridge, there is no account of how the 'resurrected' person can be identical with the person who died.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Personal identity over time already requires no continuous physical substance, as van Inwagen's 'falling elevator' cases show bodies are replaced constantly.
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    • 2.If ordinary survival through sleep or unconsciousness tolerates spatio-temporal gaps in physical continuity, resurrection gaps differ only in degree, not kind.
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    • 3.Peter van Inwagen's 'reassembly' model proposes God preserves the numerically identical matter, dissolving the gap problem without abandoning materialism.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Psychological continuity theories (Locke, Parfit) ground personal identity in memory and psychological connectedness, not unbroken physical continuity.
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    • 2.A resurrected person with the correct psychological connections to the deceased satisfies the dominant philosophical criteria for personal identity regardless of material gaps.
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    Afterlife & Death

    Related

    A resurrected person with the correct psychological connections to the deceased ...For materialism, nothing bridges the spatio-temporal gap between the body that p...If ordinary survival through sleep or unconsciousness tolerates spatio-temporal ...Personal identity over time already requires no continuous physical substance, a...
    +3 moreShow less
    Peter van Inwagen's 'reassembly' model proposes God preserves the numerically id...Psychological continuity theories (Locke, Parfit) ground personal identity in me...Without such a bridge, there is no account of how the 'resurrected' person can b...

    Similar

    It has not been shown conclusively that an identity-preserving materia...85%The identity of a person over time cannot consist of the identity of t...75%Baker's constitution view of persons opens the way for a doctrine of r...74%Since persons are not identical with their bodies, it need not be main...72%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: afterlife
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    The central logical problem for materialist versions of the resurrection is personal identity. On dualist assumptions, personal identity is preserved by the persistence of the soul between death and resurrection. But for materialism, nothing bridges the spatio-temporal gap between the body that perishes and that body resurrected. Without such a bridge, how can the “resurrected” person be identical with the person who died? Considerable ingenuity has been expended in the search for an answer to this question.

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit