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    Phenomenal concepts, as argued by Papineau and Loar, have... — Carmelics
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    Supports→The zombie argument against physicalism fails because zombies are not metaphysically possible, even if they are conceptually possible.

    Phenomenal concepts, as argued by Papineau and Loar, have a dual character that makes it coherent to conceive of qualia without physical descriptions without tracking distinct metaphysical facts.

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    Key Terms

    Dual character(as used in philosophy of mind)
    Having two different aspects or ways of being understood at the same time—here, the idea that one concept can be thought about in two distinct ways.
    Metaphysical facts(as what Strawson argues is NOT necessary for moral responsibility)
    Deep truths about the nature of reality itself—things like whether free will exists or whether the future is determined.
    Papineau and Loar(as philosophers studying consciousness)
    David Papineau and Brian Loar are contemporary philosophers who study consciousness and how our thoughts about mental experiences work; they argued that the way we think about feelings doesn't require us to believe in anything non-physical.
    Physical descriptions(as the only way mental events are claimed to have effects)
    Explanations of events in terms of physical matter, energy, and the laws of physics rather than mental or non-physical terms.

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    phenomenal concepts(Contrasted with physical concepts, which are theoretical (Loar 1999))
    Recognitional concepts that express the very properties they pick out.
    qualia(The passage presents two competing definitions to contrast the views)
    On the Cartesian picture: intrinsic qualities of inner ideas of which subjects are directly aware, necessarily shared by internal duplicates regardless of environment. On wide representationalism: representational contents of inner states whose nature is partly externally determined

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    The zombie argument against physicalism fails because zombies are not metaphysic...

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