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    The zombie argument against physicalism fails because zom... — Carmelics
    Home/Consciousness & Mind
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    The zombie argument against physicalism fails because zombies are not metaphysically possible, even if they are conceptually possible.

    Consciousness & Mind
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Kripke's modal semantics shows that identity statements like 'pain = C-fiber firing' are rigid designators, necessary if true at all.
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    • 2.If physicalist type-identity holds necessarily, then a world with physical duplicates but absent qualia violates the necessity of that identity.
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    • 3.Therefore zombie conceivability reflects an epistemic gap in our concepts, not a genuine metaphysical possibility, as Levine's explanatory gap argument itself concedes.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Chalmers' conceivability-to-possibility inference presupposes that ideal rational reflection eliminates all epistemic illusions about modal space.
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    • 2.Phenomenal concepts, as argued by Papineau and Loar, have a dual character that makes it coherent to conceive of qualia without physical descriptions without tracking distinct metaphysical facts.
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    • 3.When phenomenal concepts refer to physical states via direct acquaintance rather than descriptive modes, conceiving zombies reflects conceptual duplication, not ontological separation.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.The anti-physicalist zombie argument requires metaphysical possibility of zombies, not merely conceptual possibility.
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    • 2.Zombies may be conceptually possible (no obvious contradiction in the idea) without being metaphysically possible.
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    • 3.Granting conceptual possibility alone does not entail metaphysical possibility.
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    Consciousness & Mind

    Related

    Chalmers' conceivability-to-possibility inference presupposes that ideal rationa...Granting conceptual possibility alone does not entail metaphysical possibility.If physicalist type-identity holds necessarily, then a world with physical dupli...Kripke's modal semantics shows that identity statements like 'pain = C-fiber fir...
    +5 moreShow less
    Phenomenal concepts, as argued by Papineau and Loar, have a dual character that ...The anti-physicalist zombie argument requires metaphysical possibility of zombie...Therefore zombie conceivability reflects an epistemic gap in our concepts, not a...When phenomenal concepts refer to physical states via direct acquaintance rather...Zombies may be conceptually possible (no obvious contradiction in the idea) with...

    Similar

    The anti-physicalist zombie argument requires metaphysical possibility...94%Chalmers' zombie argument, if successful, shows that phenomenal proper...88%If zombies are conceivable, then consciousness is not identical to or ...87%The conceivability argument against materialism fails because the idea...85%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: qualia
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    One well-known physicalist reply to the case of zombies (Loar 1990) is to grant that they are conceptually possible, or at least that there is no obvious contradiction in the idea of a zombie, while denying that zombies are metaphysically possible. Since the anti-physicalist argument requires metaphysical possibility — mere conceptual possibility will not suffice — it now collapses. That conceptual possibility is too weak for the anti-physicalist’s purposes (at least without further qualificatio
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit