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    Phenomenal consciousness cannot imply any intentionality ... — Carmelics
    Home/Philosophy of Language
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    Supports→The stream of consciousness comprises nothing more than sensations and images, which are to be set apart from thought and meaning

    Phenomenal consciousness cannot imply any intentionality or content

    Consciousness & MindPhilosophy of Language
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

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    • 1.The phenomenal character of experience is fixed internally and has no necessary relation to the nature of particular substances in one's external environment or to one's linguistic community
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    • 2.Externalist arguments (such as those of Putnam and Burge) show that neither meaning nor content is 'in the head'
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Phenomenal states exhibit intentional directedness (aboutness) as an intrinsic structural feature, not merely as an extrinsic relational property.
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    • 2.Brentano's thesis that intentionality is the mark of the mental entails that phenomenal states, paradigmatically mental, possess intrinsic intentional content.
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    • 3.Husserl's phenomenological analyses demonstrate that the noetic-noematic structure is constitutive of conscious experience itself, not added from outside.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Externalist arguments establish narrow/wide content distinctions but do not eliminate the narrow, internally-fixed intentional content that phenomenal states carry.
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    • 2.Even if wide content is not 'in the head,' narrow phenomenal content—fixing how the world is represented from the subject's perspective—remains an intrinsic feature of experience.
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    • 3.Ned Block's and David Chalmers's work on narrow content shows that Twin Earth cases underdetermine whether phenomenal states lack intentionality altogether.
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    Philosophy of LanguageConsciousness & Mind

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    Related

    Brentano's thesis that intentionality is the mark of the mental entails that phe...Even if wide content is not 'in the head,' narrow phenomenal content—fixing how ...Externalist arguments (such as those of Putnam and Burge) show that neither mean...Externalist arguments establish narrow/wide content distinctions but do not elim...
    +6 moreShow less
    Husserl's phenomenological analyses demonstrate that the noetic-noematic structu...Ned Block's and David Chalmers's work on narrow content shows that Twin Earth ca...Phenomenal states exhibit intentional directedness (aboutness) as an intrinsic s...Sensations and images (in the Fregean sense) are distinct from thought and meani...The phenomenal character of experience is fixed internally and has no necessary ...The stream of consciousness comprises nothing more than sensations and images, w...

    Similar

    Therefore consciousness is not intrinsically intentional.89%If consciousness were intrinsically intentional, consciousness could n...86%Therefore, consciousness cannot become an objective content of conscio...86%When consciousness has no objects to illumine, no intentional experien...85%

    Source

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    SEP: consciousness-intentionality
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    Externalist arguments (of the sort mentioned in Section 4) have also been taken to support the separation of the “qualitative” from meaning and content (hence the separation of consciousness from intentionality). For it has been sometimes assumed that the phenomenal character of one’s experience is “fixed internally”—i.e., it has no necessary relation to the nature of particular substances in one’s external environment or to one’s linguistic community. Thus if externalist arguments (like those o

    Details

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    premise
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit