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    Phenomenal consciousness involves qualitative properties ... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→The mind-brain identity theory is preferable to dualism

    Phenomenal consciousness involves qualitative properties (qualia) that are not captured by any functional or physical description.

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    1 reason for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.The subjective character of pain (what it's like) seems conceptually distinct from pain's functional role in behavior.
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    • 2.Complete physical knowledge of color processing doesn't explain why red looks that particular way to conscious subjects.
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    • 3.Imaginability arguments show zombies (beings physically identical but unconscious) are conceptually coherent, suggesting consciousness is non-physical.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Our intuitions about conceivability (zombies) don't reliably track metaphysical possibility; they often fail in physics.
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    • 2.The explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal may reflect limitations in current neuroscience, not metaphysical dualism.
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    • 3.All known properties of conscious systems eventually yielded to functional or neuroscientific explanation; consciousness may too.
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    Consciousness & Mind1 linked

    Related

    All known properties of conscious systems eventually yielded to functional or ne...Complete physical knowledge of color processing doesn't explain why red looks th...Imaginability arguments show zombies (beings physically identical but unconsciou...Our intuitions about conceivability (zombies) don't reliably track metaphysical ...
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    The explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal may reflect limitations in c...The mind-brain identity theory is preferable to dualismThe subjective character of pain (what it's like) seems conceptually distinct fr...

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