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Inverse View
It is not the case that Phenomenal consciousness involves qualitative properties (qualia) that are not captured by any functional or physical description.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
Our intuitions about conceivability (zombies) don't reliably track metaphysical possibility; they often fail in physics.
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2.
The explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal may reflect limitations in current neuroscience, not metaphysical dualism.
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3.
All known properties of conscious systems eventually yielded to functional or neuroscientific explanation; consciousness may too.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
The subjective character of pain (what it's like) seems conceptually distinct from pain's functional role in behavior.
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2.
Complete physical knowledge of color processing doesn't explain why red looks that particular way to conscious subjects.
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3.
Imaginability arguments show zombies (beings physically identical but unconscious) are conceptually coherent, suggesting consciousness is non-physical.
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