Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Physical theory does not tell us about the categorical pr... — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Philosophy of Language
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Part of a larger discussion

    Supports→If physical objects have categorical properties, those categorical properties will not count as physical by the standards of the theory conception of the physical.

    Physical theory does not tell us about the categorical properties of physical objects, only their dispositional properties.

    Consciousness & MindPhilosophy of Language
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Physical theory only tells us about the dispositional properties of physical objects.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Dispositional properties are distinct from categorical properties.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Structural realists like Ladyman argue that the distinction between dispositional and categorical properties collapses at the fundamental level.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If all properties are ultimately relational and structural, there is no residual categorical base that physical theory fails to capture.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Quine and others have argued that dispositional idioms are fully reducible to extensional, occurrent physical descriptions without categorical remainder.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If dispositions can be analyzed in terms of physical law-governed regularities, the claim that theory omits categorical properties presupposes an unjustified ontological dualism within physics itself.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

    Topics

    Philosophy of LanguageConsciousness & Mind

    Connections

    1 topic

    Modality & Possibility2 linked

    Related

    Dispositional properties are distinct from categorical properties.If all properties are ultimately relational and structural, there is no residual...If dispositions can be analyzed in terms of physical law-governed regularities, ...Physical theory only tells us about the dispositional properties of physical obj...
    +2 moreShow less
    Quine and others have argued that dispositional idioms are fully reducible to ex...Structural realists like Ladyman argue that the distinction between dispositiona...

    Similar

    Physical theory does not describe the categorical properties of physic...99%Physical theory only tells us about the dispositional properties of ph...96%If physical objects have categorical properties, those properties are ...91%If physical objects have categorical properties, those categorical pro...89%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: physicalism
    View source passageHide passage
    Do these conceptions characterize the same class of properties? There are a number of different possibilities here, but one that has received some attention in the literature is that physical theory only tells us about the dispositional properties of physical objects, and so does not tell us about the categorical properties, if any, that they have — a thesis of this sort has been defended by a number of philosophers, among them Russell (1927), Armstrong (1968), Blackburn (1992) and Chalmers (199
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit