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Inverse View
It is not the case that Physical theory does not tell us about the categorical properties of physical objects, only their dispositional properties.
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Reasons For
2 perspectives
Reason for 1 of 2
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1.
Structural realists like Ladyman argue that the distinction between dispositional and categorical properties collapses at the fundamental level.
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2.
If all properties are ultimately relational and structural, there is no residual categorical base that physical theory fails to capture.
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Reason for 2 of 2
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1.
Quine and others have argued that dispositional idioms are fully reducible to extensional, occurrent physical descriptions without categorical remainder.
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2.
If dispositions can be analyzed in terms of physical law-governed regularities, the claim that theory omits categorical properties presupposes an unjustified ontological dualism within physics itself.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Physical theory only tells us about the dispositional properties of physical objects.
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2.
Dispositional properties are distinct from categorical properties.
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