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    Plantinga's argument presupposes that existence is always... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→On a Plantinga-style approach, God cannot be identical to his existence.

    Plantinga's argument presupposes that existence is always a property distinct from its possessor, but necessitarians like van Inwagen and Prior argue that for a necessary being, existence and essence may converge in ways that dissolve the subject-property gap.

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    1 reason for
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    Reasons For

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    Reason for
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    • 1.Necessary beings cannot lack their defining features without ceasing to exist, so existence and essence are inseparable for them.
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    • 2.Plantinga's modal semantics assumes all properties are contingent additions to a subject, but this fails for metaphysically necessary entities.
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    • 3.The subject-property framework works for contingent beings but breaks down when applied to entities whose very nature is to exist.
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    Reasons Against

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    Reason against
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    • 1.Even if existence and essence converge for necessary beings, this requires distinguishing between the two conceptually—presupposing the gap.
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    • 2.Calling existence a 'property' and saying it converges with essence still relies on property-talk Plantinga's logic permits formally.
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    • 3.Van Inwagen and Prior offer no clear alternative logic that avoids the subject-predicate structure Plantinga's argument requires to function.
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    Key Terms

    Converge(describing how existence and essence might relate for necessary beings)
    Come together or merge into the same thing; stop being separate.
    Plantinga
    Alvin Plantinga is an American philosopher best known for his work on the philosophy of religion, particularly his arguments defending religious belief as rational and reasonable. He developed influential ideas about how people can rationally believe in God without needing scientific proof, arguing that faith and reason aren't necessarily in conflict. His work has shaped modern religious philosophy and made him one of the most important Christian philosophers of the past 50 years.
    Presupposes(as describing what Plantinga's argument takes for granted)
    Assumes something to be true without proving it—like how an argument might presuppose that logic works, without first arguing that logic is valid.
    Prior(in Bayesian reasoning)
    Your initial beliefs or probability assignments about something before you receive any new evidence or information.
    Subject-property gap(as something that might be dissolved or overcome)
    The idea that there's a distinction between a thing itself and the qualities or characteristics it has—like how an apple is separate from its redness.
    essence(Medieval realist metaphysics)
    The defining nature of a species, held by some to be distinct from and capable of surviving the destruction of all individual members of that species
    necessary being(Theistic metaphysics)
    A being that exists and is God in every possible world
    necessitarians(debate over the modal status of laws of nature)
    Those who believe that the laws of nature, or the laws conditionalized on the existence of the properties mentioned in them, are metaphysically necessary
    property(Locke's demonstration of the moral proposition 'Where there is no property, there is no injustice.')
    A right to something.
    van Inwagen(as a philosopher being cited as a necessitarian)
    Peter van Inwagen is a contemporary American philosopher who studies questions about what exists, what it means to exist, and whether God must exist.

    Connections

    1 topic

    Divine Attributes1 linked

    Related

    Calling existence a 'property' and saying it converges with essence still relies...Even if existence and essence converge for necessary beings, this requires disti...Necessary beings cannot lack their defining features without ceasing to exist, s...On a Plantinga-style approach, God cannot be identical to his existence.

    Details

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    Perspectives
    2 (1 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit
    +3 moreShow less
    Plantinga's modal semantics assumes all properties are contingent additions to a...The subject-property framework works for contingent beings but breaks down when ...Van Inwagen and Prior offer no clear alternative logic that avoids the subject-p...