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    Carmelics

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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Plantinga's argument presupposes that existence is always a property distinct from its possessor, but necessitarians like van Inwagen and Prior argue that for a necessary being, existence and essence may converge in ways that dissolve the subject-property gap.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Even if existence and essence converge for necessary beings, this requires distinguishing between the two conceptually—presupposing the gap.
      ?

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    • 2.Calling existence a 'property' and saying it converges with essence still relies on property-talk Plantinga's logic permits formally.
      ?

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    • 3.Van Inwagen and Prior offer no clear alternative logic that avoids the subject-predicate structure Plantinga's argument requires to function.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Necessary beings cannot lack their defining features without ceasing to exist, so existence and essence are inseparable for them.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Plantinga's modal semantics assumes all properties are contingent additions to a subject, but this fails for metaphysically necessary entities.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.The subject-property framework works for contingent beings but breaks down when applied to entities whose very nature is to exist.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

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