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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Possible world semantics can be regarded as an ontologically inert formal instrument rather than a metaphysically substantive framework.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Quantification over possible worlds in modal semantics commits the theorist to an ontology of worlds as entities, per Quine's criterion of ontological commitment.
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.A formal system that requires quantification over a domain carries commitment to that domain's existence, regardless of the theorist's instrumental intentions.
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Lewis's modal realism demonstrates that taking possible world semantics seriously as a truth-apt framework generates unavoidable pressure toward metaphysical realism about worlds.
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Rosen's 1990 'Modal Fictionalism' argument shows that treating worlds as mere fictions generates a vicious circularity, since the fictionalist operator itself requires modal analysis.
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Any semantic framework that successfully explains the truth conditions of modal claims must appeal to something that makes those conditions obtain, which is a substantive metaphysical commitment.
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.If modal statements do not require grounding in possible individuals or their actualist proxies, then possible world semantics need not carry ontological commitment.
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Strict actualists deny that modal statements require such grounding.
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    • 3.A formal system that carries no ontological commitment is merely a useful heuristic or instrument.
      ?

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    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.