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    Made withinDC&Austin
    Possible world semantics can be regarded as an ontologica... — Carmelics
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    Home/Philosophy of Language
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    Possible world semantics can be regarded as an ontologically inert formal instrument rather than a metaphysically substantive framework.

    Modality & PossibilityPhilosophy of Language
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.If modal statements do not require grounding in possible individuals or their actualist proxies, then possible world semantics need not carry ontological commitment.
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    • 2.Strict actualists deny that modal statements require such grounding.
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    • 3.A formal system that carries no ontological commitment is merely a useful heuristic or instrument.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Quantification over possible worlds in modal semantics commits the theorist to an ontology of worlds as entities, per Quine's criterion of ontological commitment.
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    • 2.A formal system that requires quantification over a domain carries commitment to that domain's existence, regardless of the theorist's instrumental intentions.
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    • 3.Lewis's modal realism demonstrates that taking possible world semantics seriously as a truth-apt framework generates unavoidable pressure toward metaphysical realism about worlds.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Rosen's 1990 'Modal Fictionalism' argument shows that treating worlds as mere fictions generates a vicious circularity, since the fictionalist operator itself requires modal analysis.
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    • 2.Any semantic framework that successfully explains the truth conditions of modal claims must appeal to something that makes those conditions obtain, which is a substantive metaphysical commitment.
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    Topics

    Philosophy of LanguageModality & Possibility

    Related

    A formal system that carries no ontological commitment is merely a useful heuris...A formal system that requires quantification over a domain carries commitment to...Any semantic framework that successfully explains the truth conditions of modal ...If modal statements do not require grounding in possible individuals or their ac...
    +4 moreShow less
    Lewis's modal realism demonstrates that taking possible world semantics seriousl...Quantification over possible worlds in modal semantics commits the theorist to a...Rosen's 1990 'Modal Fictionalism' argument shows that treating worlds as mere fi...Strict actualists deny that modal statements require such grounding.

    Similar

    Possible worlds semantics may not fully resolve the question of what p...81%Possible worlds must be defined in an actualistically acceptable way i...81%If modal statements do not require grounding in possible individuals o...80%Possible worlds are themselves a variety of possibilia if one takes po...80%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: possibilism-actualism
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    How then do things stand for the strict actualist with respect to the first element of the possibilist’s two-fold challenge? The answer of course depends entirely on what one takes to be a “systematically and philosophically satisfying” account of the truth conditions for modal assertions like (2). Possibilists (and their haecceitist and eliminitivist counterparts) clearly consider preservation of Tarski-style compositionality (formalized in an appropriate notion of an intended interpretation)
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit