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    Possible worlds semantics may not fully resolve the quest... — Carmelics
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    Home/Philosophy of Language
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    Possible worlds semantics may not fully resolve the question of what propositions are.

    Modality & Possibility
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

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    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Propositions individuated as sets of possible worlds cannot distinguish logically equivalent but cognitively distinct contents, as Frege's puzzle demonstrates.
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    • 2.All necessary truths map to the same set (all possible worlds), yet 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' and '2+2=4' express distinct cognitive meanings.
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    • 3.Any semantics that collapses cognitively distinct propositions into identical objects has failed to fully characterize propositional identity.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Hyperintensional contexts—such as belief reports—require finer-grained propositional distinctions than sets of possible worlds can provide, as shown by Cresswell and Lewis.
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    • 2.Since possible worlds semantics systematically fails in hyperintensional contexts, the account is incomplete as a general theory of propositional content.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Possible worlds semantics defines propositions as sets of possible worlds.
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    • 2.One may further ask what possible worlds themselves are, leaving the nature of propositions incompletely specified.
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    Topics

    Philosophy of LanguageModality & Possibility

    Related

    All necessary truths map to the same set (all possible worlds), yet 'Hesperus is...Any semantics that collapses cognitively distinct propositions into identical ob...Hyperintensional contexts—such as belief reports—require finer-grained propositi...One may further ask what possible worlds themselves are, leaving the nature of p...
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    Possible worlds semantics defines propositions as sets of possible worlds.Propositions individuated as sets of possible worlds cannot distinguish logicall...Since possible worlds semantics systematically fails in hyperintensional context...

    Similar

    Possible worlds semantics defines propositions as sets of possible wor...92%Possible worlds semantics defines propositions as sets of possible wor...90%Of the three main propositionalist approaches, only possible worlds se...89%One may further ask what possible worlds themselves are, leaving the n...85%

    Source

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    Most philosophers believe in propositions, and hence think that semantics should be done according to one of the three broad categories of propositionalist approaches sketched above: possible worlds semantics, Russellianism, or Fregeanism. But it is notable that of these three views, only one—possible worlds semantics—actually tells us what propositions are. (Even in that case, of course, one might ask what possible worlds are, and hence what propositions are sets of. See the entry on possible
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit