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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Possible worlds semantics may not fully resolve the question of what propositions are.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Possible worlds semantics defines propositions as sets of possible worlds.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.One may further ask what possible worlds themselves are, leaving the nature of propositions incompletely specified.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Propositions individuated as sets of possible worlds cannot distinguish logically equivalent but cognitively distinct contents, as Frege's puzzle demonstrates.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.All necessary truths map to the same set (all possible worlds), yet 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' and '2+2=4' express distinct cognitive meanings.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Any semantics that collapses cognitively distinct propositions into identical objects has failed to fully characterize propositional identity.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Hyperintensional contexts—such as belief reports—require finer-grained propositional distinctions than sets of possible worlds can provide, as shown by Cresswell and Lewis.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Since possible worlds semantics systematically fails in hyperintensional contexts, the account is incomplete as a general theory of propositional content.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

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