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    Carmelics

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    Made withinDC&Austin
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Postulating that states of affairs have parts creates a problem for the theory of universals

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Saying that a, b, and R are parts of the state of affairs Rab implies composition from those parts
      ?

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    • 2.No two distinct entities can be composed of exactly the same parts
      ?

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    • 3.The distinct state of affairs Rba would also be composed of a, b, and R
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Armstrong's states of affairs require a 'non-mereological' mode of combination, yet he simultaneously invokes parthood, generating an internal tension in his ontology.
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    • 2.If the combinatorial glue binding universals and particulars is itself a further entity, Bradley's regress re-emerges within Armstrong's own framework, undermining the theory's explanatory closure.
      ?

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    • 3.Any theory that posits both irreducible combination and mereological parthood for the same entities is committed to two distinct and competing composition relations, violating ontological parsimony.
      ?

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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Fine's work on arbitrary objects and Wiggins's mereological essentialism jointly entail that objects with identical proper parts cannot be numerically distinct under standard extensional mereology.
      ?

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    • 2.Relational states of affairs Rab and Rba share all the same constituents—the relation R and the relata a and b—so extensional mereology collapses them into a single entity.
      ?

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    • 3.Since ordered relations demonstrably produce distinct states of affairs, the parthood framework cannot account for relational order without abandoning extensional mereology, exposing a foundational inadequacy in the theory of universals.
      ?

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