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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Premise P3's claim that virtuous character differs from knowledge of forms relies on a post-Aristotelian distinction between intellectual and character virtues that Plato explicitly rejects through his intellectualist account of akrasia in Book IV.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Plato distinguishes spirited and appetitive parts in tripartite soul (Republic IV), allowing character virtue independent of pure knowledge of forms.
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    • 2.The claim conflates 'knowledge suffices for virtue' with 'knowledge is virtue's only component'—Plato permits embodied habituation as support for knowledge.
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    • 3.Book IV's akrasia argument targets rational failure, not character; it doesn't preclude non-cognitive virtue-development through habituation and practice.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Plato's intellectualism in Republic IV-X treats vice as ignorance, making virtue reducible to knowledge of forms, not separate character development.
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    • 2.The akrasia argument (no one errs willingly) logically entails that moral failure stems from cognitive error, not deficient character traits.
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    • 3.Medieval and Aristotelian virtue ethics explicitly bifurcate intellectual from moral virtues, a distinction absent from Platonic dialogues.
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