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It is not the case that Probabilistic causation (Suppes, Cartwright) allows causes to raise the probability of effects without making them causally necessary.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
Probability-raising alone cannot distinguish causation from mere correlation or common causes (confounding variables).
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2.
If C raises probability of E but doesn't necessitate it, competing explanations of E's occurrence become radically underdetermined.
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3.
The framework struggles with cases where a cause lowers overall probability of effect but acts through specific causal pathways (Simpson's paradox analogs).
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Many real causal relations in science (smoking→cancer, lightning→fire) involve statistical patterns, not deterministic necessity.
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2.
Probabilistic causation avoids the implausible requirement that genuine causes guarantee their effects in every instance.
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3.
This framework accommodates genuine causation in indeterministic systems, including quantum mechanics and open biological systems.
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