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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Probability-based decision thresholds can accommodate the requirement that trial evidence be reasonably complete

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Lowering probability thresholds to compensate for incomplete evidence conflates epistemic confidence with the strength of the evidentiary record itself.
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    • 2.L. Jonathan Cohen's 'inductive probability' framework shows that Pascalian probability cannot capture the evidential completeness dimension, which tracks how many relevant considerations have been investigated.
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    • 3.A threshold adjustment within a Pascalian system therefore fails to satisfy the completeness requirement because it substitutes a degree-of-belief measure for a genuinely distinct evidential concept.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.The requirement that evidence be reasonably complete is a deontological constraint on the process of adjudication, not merely an input variable to a decision-theoretic calculation.
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    • 2.Adjusting thresholds in response to incompleteness permits conviction on structurally deficient evidence so long as the numerical bar is lowered, which violates Dworkin's principle that defendants have rights against certain procedural shortcuts regardless of outcome utility.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.One way to handle incomplete or one-sided evidence is to lower the probability threshold for civil or criminal liability when the body of evidence is incomplete
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    • 2.Lowering the threshold in response to evidentiary incompleteness is a modification within the probabilistic framework, not a rejection of it
      ?

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