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Inverse View
It is not the case that Property dualism, as defended by Chalmers, holds that phenomenal properties are fundamental yet supervenient on physical substrates, not wholly inexplicable.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
Fundamental phenomenal properties violate parsimony: we gain no explanatory power by positing new basic properties beyond the physical.
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2.
Supervenience without reduction is conceptually unstable—if phenomenal properties depend entirely on physical facts, calling them 'fundamental' is misleading.
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3.
This view risks epiphenomenalism: if phenomenal properties are fundamental yet determined by physics, their causal role becomes unclear and potentially contradictory.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Consciousness exhibits qualitative properties (qualia) absent from physical descriptions, suggesting phenomenal properties constitute a distinct fundamental level.
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2.
Supervenience without reduction preserves both consciousness's causal relevance and physics's explanatory completeness at their respective levels.
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3.
The hard problem demonstrates that physical facts alone cannot fully explain why experience feels like something, supporting phenomenal irreducibility.
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