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Inverse View
It is not the case that Propositional completeness of S does not entail cognitive or epistemic completeness, as Levine's explanatory gap argument demonstrates.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
The explanatory gap reflects epistemic limitations of current science, not metaphysical incompleteness of physical description.
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2.
Subjective experience may be a complex functional or relational property adequately captured in sophisticated propositional terms.
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3.
Levine himself rejected inferring ontological gaps from epistemological gaps, undermining the argument's strongest interpretation.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Complete physical descriptions of neural correlates leave subjective qualities (qualia) unexplained, revealing an explanatory gap.
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2.
Knowledge-by-acquaintance of conscious experience differs categorically from propositional knowledge about brain states.
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3.
Logical entailment requires no explanatory remainder; propositional completeness demonstrably leaves one, so entailment fails.
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