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    Propositional completeness of S does not entail cognitive... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→If physicalism is true and S summarizes the total nature of the world, then S# is already implicitly included in S, making the proposition S# merely an expansion of S rather than an independent claim.

    Propositional completeness of S does not entail cognitive or epistemic completeness, as Levine's explanatory gap argument demonstrates.

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    Reasons For

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    Reason for
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    • 1.Complete physical descriptions of neural correlates leave subjective qualities (qualia) unexplained, revealing an explanatory gap.
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    • 2.Knowledge-by-acquaintance of conscious experience differs categorically from propositional knowledge about brain states.
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    • 3.Logical entailment requires no explanatory remainder; propositional completeness demonstrably leaves one, so entailment fails.
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    Reasons Against

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    • 1.The explanatory gap reflects epistemic limitations of current science, not metaphysical incompleteness of physical description.
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    • 2.Subjective experience may be a complex functional or relational property adequately captured in sophisticated propositional terms.
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    • 3.Levine himself rejected inferring ontological gaps from epistemological gaps, undermining the argument's strongest interpretation.
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    Truth & Knowledge1 linkedConsciousness & Mind1 linked

    Related

    Complete physical descriptions of neural correlates leave subjective qualities (...If physicalism is true and S summarizes the total nature of the world, then S# i...Knowledge-by-acquaintance of conscious experience differs categorically from pro...Levine himself rejected inferring ontological gaps from epistemological gaps, un...
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    Logical entailment requires no explanatory remainder; propositional completeness...Subjective experience may be a complex functional or relational property adequat...The explanatory gap reflects epistemic limitations of current science, not metap...

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    2 (1 for, 1 against)
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