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    Quantifier criteria for ontological commitment face probl... — Carmelics
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    Quantifier criteria for ontological commitment face problems when there are metaphysically necessary connections between non-identical things.

    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

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    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Quine's criterion ties ontological commitment to existential quantification, but necessitation relations (e.g., singleton sets necessitating their members) import ontological baggage no bound variable captures.
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    • 2.Fine's work on essence shows that {Socrates} essentially involves Socrates, yet no quantifier ranging over sets automatically commits us to the member—necessity outstrips quantification.
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    • 3.If commitment to X suffices for commitment to whatever X necessarily involves, then the quantifier criterion is incomplete without a closure principle it cannot itself supply.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Armstrong's truthmaker theory demonstrates that some truths require ontological grounds—necessitators—that needn't appear as values of bound variables in any canonical paraphrase.
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    • 2.Grounding relations, as developed by Schaffer and Rosen, are metaphysically necessary yet asymmetric: being committed to the ground does not automatically register commitment to the grounded entity via quantification alone.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Quantifier criteria hold that a theory is ontologically committed only to entities that must be assigned as values to bound variables for the theory to be true.
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    • 2.Metaphysically necessary connections between non-identical things generate implicit ontological commitments that are not captured by what is assigned as values to bound variables.
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    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge

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    Philosophy of Language1 linked

    Related

    Armstrong's truthmaker theory demonstrates that some truths require ontological ...Fine's work on essence shows that {Socrates} essentially involves Socrates, yet ...Grounding relations, as developed by Schaffer and Rosen, are metaphysically nece...If commitment to X suffices for commitment to whatever X necessarily involves, t...
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    Metaphysically necessary connections between non-identical things generate impli...Quantifier criteria hold that a theory is ontologically committed only to entiti...Quine's criterion ties ontological commitment to existential quantification, but...

    Similar

    Modal criteria for ontological commitment cannot distinguish between c...91%Modal criteria may introduce spurious ontological commitments when the...91%A criterion of ontological commitment that omits implicit ontological ...87%If ontological commitment is to play a role in theory choice or clarif...86%

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    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: ontological-commitment
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    The problem of extrinsic properties arises because there are analytic connections between one predicate holding of a thing and another predicate holding of some other thing. Similar problems arise for quantifier criteria if there are metaphysically necessary connections between non-identical things. Thus, if a set cannot exist without its members existing, then it appears that a theory that contains ‘∃x x = {a, b}’ is ontologically committed to the existence of a. But a need not be assigned as
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    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit