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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Quantifier criteria for ontological commitment face problems when there are metaphysically necessary connections between non-identical things.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Quantifier criteria hold that a theory is ontologically committed only to entities that must be assigned as values to bound variables for the theory to be true.
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    • 2.Metaphysically necessary connections between non-identical things generate implicit ontological commitments that are not captured by what is assigned as values to bound variables.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Quine's criterion ties ontological commitment to existential quantification, but necessitation relations (e.g., singleton sets necessitating their members) import ontological baggage no bound variable captures.
      ?

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    • 2.Fine's work on essence shows that {Socrates} essentially involves Socrates, yet no quantifier ranging over sets automatically commits us to the member—necessity outstrips quantification.
      ?

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    • 3.If commitment to X suffices for commitment to whatever X necessarily involves, then the quantifier criterion is incomplete without a closure principle it cannot itself supply.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Armstrong's truthmaker theory demonstrates that some truths require ontological grounds—necessitators—that needn't appear as values of bound variables in any canonical paraphrase.
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    • 2.Grounding relations, as developed by Schaffer and Rosen, are metaphysically necessary yet asymmetric: being committed to the ground does not automatically register commitment to the grounded entity via quantification alone.
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