Quine argued in 'Set Theory and Its Logic' that Russell-style paradoxes generated by type theory reveal the instability of treating propositions as set-like objects subject to membership conditions.
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Set Theory and Its Logic(the work being referenced)
A book by Quine that explores mathematical sets (groups of objects) and the logical rules that govern them.
Set-like objects(how the statement treats propositions incorrectly)
Things that behave like mathematical collections or groups, where you can ask whether something 'belongs' to them or not.
propositions(Answer to the question of what metaphysical category propositions belong to)
Entities belonging to a sui generis metaphysical category of their own kind, not reducible to other categories
type theory(Introduced by Russell and Whitehead to resolve set-theoretic and semantic paradoxes)
A logical framework that organizes entities into an infinite hierarchy of types, where classes of sets are of a higher type than sets of individuals, preventing self-membership and cross-type predication