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    Quinean nominalists can block the One Over Many argument ... — Carmelics
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    Home/Philosophy of Language
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    Quinean nominalists can block the One Over Many argument by appealing to bruteness in a more subtle way

    Modality & PossibilityPhilosophy of Language
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Nominalists cannot claim all predicative facts are brute facts
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    • 2.There is a more subtle way to appeal to bruteness, as Devitt points out
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    • 3.This more subtle appeal to bruteness is available to Quinean nominalists
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Devitt's 'bruteness' strategy merely relocates the explanatory burden rather than dissolving it, leaving primitive resemblance unexplained.
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    • 2.Armstrong's immanent realism demonstrates that any nominalist appeal to brute predication still requires a truthmaker, which bare particulars cannot provide.
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    • 3.A regress of unexplained resemblances is no less problematic than the original One Over Many demand for a common property.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Rodriguez-Pereyra's resemblance nominalism shows that 'subtle bruteness' collapses into an infinite resemblance regress that Quinean ontology cannot arrest.
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    • 2.Quine's own criterion of ontological commitment, applied consistently, forces quantification over properties when predicates appear in true sentences, undermining any nominalist block.
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    Topics

    Philosophy of LanguageModality & Possibility

    Related

    A regress of unexplained resemblances is no less problematic than the original O...Armstrong's immanent realism demonstrates that any nominalist appeal to brute pr...Devitt's 'bruteness' strategy merely relocates the explanatory burden rather tha...Nominalists cannot claim all predicative facts are brute facts
    +4 moreShow less
    Quine's own criterion of ontological commitment, applied consistently, forces qu...Rodriguez-Pereyra's resemblance nominalism shows that 'subtle bruteness' collaps...There is a more subtle way to appeal to bruteness, as Devitt points outThis more subtle appeal to bruteness is available to Quinean nominalists

    Similar

    This more subtle appeal to bruteness is available to Quinean nominalis...91%There is a more subtle way to appeal to bruteness, as Devitt points ou...77%Paraphrase nominalism fails in the case of propositions77%If a nominalist explains why object a is F by appealing to the fact th...76%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: platonism
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    The challenge to nominalists is to provide an explanation of facts of a certain kind, namely, predicative facts expressed by sentences of the form ‘a is F’, e.g., the fact that a given ball is red. Now, whenever we are challenged to provide an explanation of a fact, or alleged fact, we have a number options. The most obvious response is simply to provide the requested explanation. But we can also argue that the alleged fact isn't really a fact at all. Or, third, we can argue that the fact in que
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit